罗伯特·福格尔：为什么中国有可能实现其增长目标？

　　罗伯特·福格尔（Robert W.Fogel ）**

　　美国国民经济研究局研究员，1993年诺贝尔经济学奖得主

　　原载《比较》第25辑，吴敬琏主编，中信出版社，2006

　　2002年，中国共产党宣布了到2020年使人均收入实现翻两番的目标。从2000年开始，要实现这一目标，中国的人均收入的年均增长率必须达到7.2%，而GDP 的年均增长率需要达到8%左右（M.Wang ，2005）。中国有可能实现这一目标吗？这一问题已经在亚洲、欧洲和美洲引起了广泛讨论，对此既有人持乐观态度，也有人表示悲观。

　　在本文中，我将列出一些我之所以对此持乐观态度的原因。事实上，我认为，中国的GDP至少在未来30年中将很可能保持8%或更高的年均增长率。要实现这一增长目标，中国必须克服一些经济问题、结构问题以及政治问题。在对这些实质性问题进行探讨之前，我们先来看一些数据，以便为下文的分析奠定基础。

　　二战以来，亚洲的几个穷国在相对长的时间里取得了异常快速的增长率。在1950年到1970年的20年间，日本的人均收入的年均增长率达到了8.4%，人均收入增长了6倍以上，这一成果比中国政府目前制定的目标还要高出50%.而在1960年至1980年的20年里，新加坡的人均收入的年均增长率为7.2%，同期，中国台湾也达到了7.2%的水平。中国在1980年至2002年的22年间的实际年均增长率（8.2%）也比目前定下的目标要高（Fogel ，2004b ）。因此，中国领导层定下的目标完全符合东亚国家经济快速增长的经验。

　　然而，那些怀疑中国新的增长目标能否实现的人并非不了解亚洲地区这些国家已有的经验，他们只是担心，中国能否在从现在到2020年的近20年间重现那样的增长奇迹。他们之所以有这种担忧，是因为他们认为那些尚未解决的、或者不断涌现的经济问题、政治问题以及国际问题会大大削弱中国的经济增长率。其中的一个经济问题就是存在背负大量不良贷款的不稳定的银行体系。人们还认为，大批低效和亏损的国有企业也是影响未来中国经济增长的因素之一。此外，在发展较快的沿海省份和发展较慢的内陆省份之间、城乡之间以及高技能劳动者和体力劳动者之间的收入差距也在不断增长（参见Heckman ，2005）。不仅如此，中国在基础建设方面也面临着“瓶颈”，其中包括能源和电力的供给压力、环境污染的恶化等问题。尽管人们已不再怀疑中国是否有能力养活13亿人口，但越来越担心这个国家的水资源供给是否充足。以上问题并没有涵盖所有可能阻碍中国经济持续高速增长的因素，却反映了一些主要的忧虑[1].

　　虽然我也认识到了上述问题的重要性，但本文不会对这些问题做过多探讨。我认为这些都是需要在经济增长过程中加以解决的问题，并且，基于我将在本文下半部分指出的一些原因，我也深信它们会得到解决。显然，上述问题已经被中国的政治领导人及其经济顾问们提上了议事日程，事实上，他们一直在强调必须消除中国社会发展和经济发展的不平衡问题。

　　在下文中，我会首先对一些可能阻碍中国经济在未来十年保持快速增长的根本因素进行探讨，也就是说，即使我们前面提到的那些问题都能成功解决，这些制约因素也会阻碍中国可能的长期增长。

　　为了更好地理解这些制约性的因素，我们最好先对中国在1978年至2002年间的人均收入的增长来源做一个分解。对此，可参见图1中的等式（1）和等式（2）。等式（1）是一个定义式，表示人均收入水平等于工人的人均产出乘以劳动力参与率。在等式（1）中，经济产出被分解为三个部门：农业、工业和服务业。每个部门的劳动生产率用该部门的劳动力份额加权。等式（2）是对等式（1）变形后得到的增长率，它表明人均收入的增长率来自劳动力在各个部门的份额的变化、每个部门的劳动生产率的变化、以及总体的劳动力参与率的变化，各部门的权重采用的是该部门的收入在整体经济中所占的份额。

　　表1显示，在1978年至2002年间，中国的人均收入69%的增长都来源于三大部门内部劳动生产率的提高[2].其中，工业部门虽然存在很多低效的国有企业且资本配置效率较低，但其劳动生产率的增长却最为迅速。正如林毅夫等人（Lin 和Tsai，2004，第355～356页）

　　指出的那样，中国逐渐从中央计划体制向市场经济过渡的政策似乎比那些激进的方式更有效。

　　通过渐进的改革，市场的范围成功扩展了，甚至国有企业的买卖也根据市场价格进行，而与计划价格挂钩。

　　表1：1978-2002年增长分解中所用的变量及加权数的值

　　变量或加权数1978-2000年的年均变化率

　　表1还表明，尽管工业部门的劳动生产率提高最为迅速，但农业部门的劳动力生产率的进步也几乎不相上下（工业部门为6.2%，农业部门为5.7%）。此外，农业部门生产率的迅速提高已经持续了20多年。表2则显示，尽管中国的农业劳动生产率在这20多年的增长率并非前所未有，但与亚洲和欧洲其他国家相比却依然出类拔萃。事实上，只有韩国的农业劳动生产率在1980年至1997年间的增长率超过了中国，但当时，韩国的大部分农业劳动力都已经转移到了工业和服务业部门。就中国而言，近一半的劳动力依旧保留在农业部门，因此，劳动力可以继续向工业和服务也大规模转移，那么与1980年到2000年的20年相比，农业劳动生产率在未来20年可能有更大的提高潜力。

　　表2：部分国家农业劳动生产率的年均增长率（%）

　　资料来源：（a ）2000/2001年世界发展报告，表8.

　　（b ）世界银行，世界发展指数，http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI

　　（c ）Jorgenson 和Stiroh，2000，表2.

　　（d ）亚洲开发银行，2004.

　　由于在中国的经济增长率中有30%可能继续来源于劳动力的部门转移以及劳动参与率的小幅增长（Johnson 2000），因此，各行业内的平均劳动生产率每年只需要提高5%，即可实现预定的人均收入增长目标。若干因素显示，这种增长率的实现不是没有可能的。尽管近几十年来中国已经取得了巨大的进步，但在农业、工业和服务业这三个部门中，平均的技术水平还是大大低于国际领先者。因此，先进经验的推广会促进各部门的增长。其次，前沿技术的创新速度非常快，尤其是在工业和服务业领域，当然农业领域也是如此。第三，对资本尤其是人力资本的投资也会在接下来的几十年中促进经济的快速增长。最后，尽管目前人们都认为由于地方政府上报的增长率存在夸大现象，中国的经济增长率有可能被高估了，但总体而言，由于没有考虑到经济产出的质量的进步，以及小企业低报收入的情况，中国经济的实际增长率尤其是服务业的增长率也很有可能被低估。现在，我想对上述的最后两个因素做一个简要地说明，并对这两个因素在未来二三十年中可能对增长率造成的影响进行估计。

　　要素升级的作用

　　表3显示了中国在1980年、1990年、1997年以及2000年的小学、中学以及大学的入学率，并与7个亚洲国家、4个西欧国家以及美国进行了比较。中国的小学入学率超过其他所有国家，中学入学率与其他新兴工业化国家不相上下，但落后于韩国、日本、西欧以及美国。不过，在1990年至1997年间，这一差距已经迅速需缩小。在这短短的几年中，中国的中学入学率增长了40%.中国与发达国家在大学入学率方面差距最大，相当于韩国、日本、西欧和美国的入学率的15%~27%.然而，这一差距同样也在迅速缩小。1990年至2004年，中国的大学入学率提高了6倍（中国统计年鉴，2005）。

　　表3：各国的毛入学率

　　资料来源：美国教育部、国家教育统计中心，2004，表394.

　　http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/xls/tabn394.xls

　　备注：毛入学率等于所有年龄段在校学生的总人数除以特定年龄段的学龄人口数所得的值。由于相关年龄段以外的学生也包含在内，因此该比率的值有可能会超过100.

　　通过图2中的等式，我们可以将由教育导致的劳动力质量的提高对人均收入增长率的影响进行定量处理。等式（3）是一个反映要素升级影响的生产函数，其中YL、YK分别代表劳动和资本的升级指数（我的讨论将仅限于劳动）。等式（4）是等式（3）的变形，因变量是劳动生产率，中括号里的项包括各种要素的升级指数与全要素生产率的增长指数。等式（5）是从等式（4）中得到的增长率表达式，它意味着如果其他所有变量都为常数，那么劳动生产率的增长率应该等于劳动升级的增长率乘以劳动在收入中所占的比重。

　　图2：劳动升级型的生产函数

　　表4列出了实现等式（5）的增长率所需要的一些条件。表的上半部分列出了具有小学、高中以及大学文凭的劳动力的相对生产率指数。该指数的计算基础是美国具有不同教育水平的男性的收入。它表明，具有大学和高中文化程度的员工的劳动生产率分别是受教育年限少于9年的工人的3.1倍和1.8倍[3].表的下半部分显示了入学率的增加对经济的贡献。如果在未来20年，初中入学率达到了100%，那么劳动力升级的年均增长率会达到1.8%.将这个数字乘以劳动在收入中所占的份额，就意味着劳动生产率的增长率会提高约1.1个百分点。

　　表4：中学和高等教育导致的劳动升级对人均收入增长率的可能影响

　　α值来源于Young （2000），指数值是根据美国的以教育程度衡量的中期收入计算出来的（美国教育部、国家教育统计中心，2001，表383，http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d01/dt383.asp

　　如果大学入学率在未来20年能从6%增加至25%，也就是说，如果未来20年中国的高等教育能达到1980年时西欧国家的水平，那么劳动升级就会以年均7.4%的速度增长。这一劳动升级水平将使劳动生产率增长4.4个百分点，仅这一个因素就能对2002年的既定目标做出60%的贡献。如果高等院校有更大规模的扩招计划，使大学入学率在未来20年内达到50%，那么劳动升级的年均增长率就会达到11.2%.光是人力资本投资这个因素就能对整体经济增长率作出6.7个百分点的贡献。

　　高等教育的这些目标并不是无法实现的。我们应该记住，就在不远的1980年，西欧国家高等院校的入学率还只有25%，只有美国超过了50%.但就在20世纪末的最后20年，西欧国家的入学率都达到了50%.比如英国，其入学率从19%增加到了52%，其中2/3的增长都发生在1990年到1997年间。

　　中国政府也意识到了人力资本投资作为经济增长引擎的重要性。早在1998年，国家领导人就发出了高等院校进行大规模扩招的号召。这一号召很快得到了响应：在接下来的4年中，高等院校的招生人数增加了165%（从340万增加到了900万），而海外留学人员的数量也增加了152%（中国统计年鉴，2003）。目前估计，到2010年，至少20%的高中毕业生会继续进入高等院校学习，而到2050的长期目标是达到50%.从2000年到2004年间，大学入学率增长了约50%（从12.5%增加到了19.0%），因此，表4中的计算结果很可能还过于保守了（中国统计年鉴，2005）。目前，中国高等院校的学生约有2000万，这一数目比现阶段美国高等院校的学生人数要多60%（Newcomb ，2005；
美国统计概要，2005）。据估计，2005年至2006年间，中国大学毕业生会达到330万，印度为310万，而美国仅为130万（Colvin，2005）。

　　不过，在科技教育的前沿领域，美国仍然遥遥领先。

　　有关GDP 测算的误差

　　(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　到目前为止，我主要集中从要素升级的视角来论述为什么中国可能实现其增长目标。现在我想就等式（5）中产出部分的测算问题进行一些探讨。国民收入账户中出现测算误差的问题正日益变得严重。很明显，美国官方估计的GDP 数据严重低估了美国经济的真实增长水平，因为他们没有将美国的产出质量的提高，尤其是像教育和卫生等服务业的质量提高计算在内。比如，现在的中学生接受的科学和技术教育比一代人以前的研究生学到的还多，与两代人之前相比就更是如此了。

　　在这方面，医疗卫生行业的进步还要突出。一个半世纪以前，40岁左右的就往往深受慢性病的困扰，情况要比现在70岁左右的人还严重。现在，不仅疾病发作的平均年龄延后了10年左右，而且一旦出现疾病，我们也可以采取各种有效的治疗措施。过去，1/4的男性会遭受疝气的长期折磨，但在今天的美国，这种疾病只需要病人住院23小时，通过一个外科手术即可解决。医疗措施能够有效地发挥作用的领域还包括泌尿生殖系统疾病的治疗、高血压的控制、中风发生几率的减少、膝关节和髋关节复位、白内障治疗以及能降低骨质疏松症和心脏病发病几率的治疗等（Fogel ，2004a ）。

　　但上述医疗卫生方面的巨大进步绝大多数都被GDP 账户忽略了，原因在于，这些部门的价值是以投入而不是产出来衡量的。与半个世纪之前相比，今天一个医生工作一个小时的费用并没有什么不同，而那时，抗生素和现代手术技术还未出现。最近，有人做了一个估计，如果能采取一种更科学的估算方法，那么医疗卫生领域的进步所产生的价值将至少是该行业的投入成本的2倍。然而，这样的计算方法并没有被GDP 账户所采用（Cutler和McClellan ，2001；
Murphy和Topel ，2003；
Nordhaus，2003）。就美国而言，根据我自己的粗略估计，如果将诸如“闲暇时间的增加”、“医疗卫生质量的提高”以及“教育质量的提高”这类因素考虑在内，那么在过去一个世纪里，美国的人均收入的年均增长率将会翻一番（从年均2.0%增长至3.6%）。

　　这些统计数字对于我们理解一般美国人的生活水平的变化会带来什么启示呢？如果我们采用传统的增长测算方法，那么美国人在2000年的实际收入就是1900年的8倍。但如果我们采取的是调整后的方法，那么美国人在2000年的实际收入就是1900年的35倍。换句话说，如今的美国人享受的80%的商品和服务都被排除在经济测量之外了（Fogel ，2000和2004）。

　　如果在衡量中国的经济增长时也不能将这种产出质量的进步考虑在内，又会产生什么影响呢？在中国，人们的预期寿命的大幅度延长主要发生在改革开放以前。在1950年到1980年之间，新生儿的预期寿命从40.8岁增加到了67.8岁。到2000年，人们的预期寿命已经达到71.4岁，即在经济改革逐渐加速的时期，预期寿命年均增加约0.18岁（Keyfitz 和Flieger ，1990；
中国统计年鉴，2003）。有关穷国和富国的人均寿命的价值的研究表明，中国人的寿命每增加一岁，所带来的价值相当于人均年收入的3.5倍（参见Murphy和Topel ，2002；
Visvusi和Aldy，2003）。因此，如果将寿命延长这种未被衡量的进步考虑在内，那么中国在1980年至2000年间的经济增长率还应该提高60%.如果中国GDP 在2000年至2040年间的实际增长率为13%而不是8%的话，那么整个中国经济的规模到2040年将是现在所测算的经济规模的6倍。

　　当然，考虑到美国和中国在产出测算中都没有考虑经济质量的改进，这两个经济体的相对排名也不会有太显著的变化。

　　政治不稳定是否会阻碍经济增长

　　到目前为止，我只是单纯地考虑了经济因素。有些分析人士认为，政治不稳定将严重阻碍中国维持高经济增长率。这样的观点描绘了好几种糟糕的可能性。有些人首先指出，由于剧烈的周期性经济波动所引起的萧败会引发失业，打破目前并不牢固的社会稳定局面。另一些人则认为金融问题和低效率的国有企业已经使中国的社会越来越动荡。他们认为，这些问题不仅会导致城市失业增加，而且也使得工资、养老金、医疗以及住房补贴不能兑现（Bremmer，2005；
Chaohua ，2005）。此外，还有人警告说，受巨额不良贷款困扰的中国银行体系即将崩溃，而这一崩溃会影响微观经济的稳定（Garnaut 和Song，2004）。

　　其他一些威胁到社会稳定的因素还包括：普遍存在的腐败；
内部权力斗争；
房地产行业、国际贸易以及钢铁（还有其他一些产品）行业的泡沫；
城乡之间、沿海和内陆之间、高级知识分子和教育程度较低的大众之间、汉族和少数民族之间的发展不平衡问题。还有一个较为新颖的观点指出，由于15岁至34岁之间的中国人的男女性别比急剧不平衡，这会引发高犯罪率和暴力行为，导致不稳定的婚姻关系。有些人还指出，国际局势的紧张，尤其是台湾问题，会使领导人不再注意力放在经济目标上（Pei ，2005；
Bradsher，2004；
Dunphy，2004，Hu，2000；
Lim ，2004；
Business Asia ，2002；
McGregor，2004；
Wilson，2004；
EIU ViewsWire，2004）。

　　在预测未来的时候，可能出现的情况几乎是没有穷尽的。但问题的关键不是有可能发生什么，而是更容易发生什么。重要的是，很多人提出的问题事实上都是中国社会长期存在的，比如低效率的国有企业问题等。尽管这些国有企业或许会成为经济发展的包袱，但中国仍然在过去25年中取得了年均8%以上的经济增长速度。那种认为这些低效企业会在一夜间破产的观点是没有说服力的。中国政府已经出台了政策，逐渐关闭了某些亏损企业，或者在保证盈利的基础上对这些企业进行了重组，以确保不会导致失业率的急剧上升。即便政府出于某些经济或政治因素的考虑需要对这些低效企业提供补贴，它也有足够的资金支持，而且这种补贴负担会逐渐消失，因为随着经济的快速增长，经营状况欠佳的国有企业提供的工业产出的比例会逐渐降低，财政补贴负担也会快速消失。

　　这些分析也同样适用于国有银行问题。尽管中国国有银行的不良贷款比例已经达到了35%，但中国并没有处于银行体系即将崩溃的边缘。政府完全有能力消除这些负担。从根本上讲，国有银行之所以受坏账所累，主要是因为当初政府要求这些银行向亏损的国有企业提供融资。

　　但是，大量流入的外商直接投资减轻了这种由融资政策引发的无效率和扭曲。中国政府一直鼓励引入外资，而这些外资在流入的同时也向中国转移了大量的先进技术。外商直接投资主要流向大企业，使得中国的各大银行有能力向那些小规模企业提供所需的资本（林毅夫、蔡昉和李周，2003；
樊纲，2005）。此外，随着政府能够更有效地利用货币体系来调控商业周期，以及资本市场改革的不断深化，中国经济生活中的扭曲现象会得到改善。举例来说，不久前中国政府对四大国有银行中的两家进行了重组，将这两家银行的资本金充足率提高到了国际水平。也许更重要的是，中国的政府债务很低，还不到GDP 的1/5，这就使政府有余地实行其所需要的稳定政策，包括对银行系统的快速重组等，而不是继续推行渐进的改革方案（林毅夫、蔡昉和李周，2003；
樊纲，2005）。

　　尽管领导层对实行什么样的经济政策或许会存在分歧，但他们的基本立场却是一致的，那就是中国应该继续推进向市场经济转型的改革。此外，关于加大地方政府的经济决策权以推动经济增长这一点，领导层也没有异议。正如很多分析人士指出的那样，中国政府团结在一个叫做“市场联邦主义”的政策周围。这种具有中国特色的联邦制会限制中央政府对经济决策的过多控制，促进地方政府之间的有效竞争，抑制寻租行为，并刺激创新型的地方企业的发展。这种联邦制在税收体系方面也体现得较为明显，被称为“财政联邦主义”，它可以避免税收对经济增长的抑制。在1994年的税收改革中，中央政府的权限限制在了增值税和中央下属的企业的所得税方面。此外，还建立了归属地方政府的地税局。尽管在财政体系构建的过程中还有很多工作要做，尤其是要缩小地方发展的不平衡，但这些问题都已经提上了国家领导人的改革日程。中央领导人同样明白地方自治权过多的危害和副作用——可能导致寻租、道德风险及其他形式的腐败，他们知道必须对地方政府的行为进行监管，同时在必要时对腐败给予处罚。要成功实现自治权的下放需要一个强有力的中央政府，它既能够将中央与地方的发展目标统一起来，又能很好地约束地方政府那些危害改革进程的腐败行为，同时还能对推动改革进程的地方政府给予奖励（林毅夫、蔡昉和李周，2003；
Bahl和Martrinez-Vazquez，2003；
Blanchard 和Shleifer，2000；
Montinola 、钱颖一和Weingast，1996；
Krug、Zhu和Hendrischke ，2003）。

　　有些分析人士还提出，除非中国引入多党竞争机制，否则中央和各省之间的关系就会非常紧张，从而会危害中国的政治稳定并阻碍经济的高速增长。还有人认为，难以解决的发展不平衡问题也使基层集聚怨愤，甚至有可能使局势失控（Goldstone ，1995；
Ohman ，1995；
Esarey，2002）。分析人士强调的其他事情还包括，环境的不断恶化、公共医疗改革发展滞后以及地方政府的腐败等（Shambaugh ，2000；
Chapman ，2002）。

　　这些论点之所以缺乏说服力，就在于它们都假设中央政府对上述问题一无所知。但显然，中国的领导人非常清楚，促进经济增长的某些政策已经削弱了中央政府对国民的日常生活和信息的控制。事实上，改革的目的之一就是要发挥地方政府的积极性、推动地方的创新，同时鼓励跨国公司进入中国市场，以引入新的思想和技术。此外，尽管中国的政治制度与西方有异，但政府仍然鼓励人们就那些阻碍经济增长的现行政策提出批评。在中国的经济学会议上，学者们关于各级政府政策的讨论的激烈和广泛程度不亚于美国经济学会。

　　为了适应不断变化的经济形势和社会形势，中国共产党的领导人也在不断调整其核心目标，并与那些处在中国经济和社会转型前沿的精英阶层开展合作。这一调整过程在中国共产党的新口号——“三个代表”——上就可以反映出来。该思想是2000年春提出来的，它取代了中国共产党先前的“三大革命阶级”（即农民、工人和士兵）的思想。“三个代表”的思想对中国共产党作了这样的定位：（1）始终代表先进的社会生产力的发展要求；
（2）始终代表中国的先进文化的前进方向；
（3）始终代表中国的最广大人民的根本利益。为了与那些推动中国社会转型的精英阶层建立更紧密的联系，中国共产党还鼓励建立各种与政府紧密合作的商业和职业组织。不仅如此，中国共产党还对党员构成进行了改革，吸纳了大量商界、社会以及学术界的人才。在1982年以来的20年中，具有大学文凭的中央委员人数从刚过50%上升到了近99%（Dickson ，2003a 和b ）。

　　在2002年11月召开的中共十六大上，省级领导们成了中央政治局的生力军，占到了总人数的42%.相反，政治局成员中军界的代表仅占8%，中央党政机关的成员则为25%.由于省级领导人在国家政策的讨论中占了重要地位，尤其是很多中央领导人也都是从省级领导人中提拔的，那么关于中央政府和省级政府之间会发生冲突的说法就没有太多意义了（Bo，2004）。

　　有些分析家认为中央政府丝毫不关心公众的意见。然而，大量翔实的证据否定了这一论调。自20世纪90年代末以来，中国的各级地方政府和省政府在制定经济和社会政策时都开始采纳民意调查的意见。对政府政策的学术讨论也非常活跃，评论者与政府最高领导人之间的互动很频繁。有关的社会调查发现的问题与学术界和国外分析人士的担忧大致相同，具体都包括腐败的蔓延、发展不平衡扩大、失业率居高不下、赋税过重以及养老金的拖欠等。但在另一方面，这些调查也反映出绝大多数人对于中央政府都持支持态度，他们坚信法院、媒体以及政府机关会对他们的困难采取负责任的态度（Pei ，2001；
Lin 等人，2002；
China Newsweek，2005）[4].

　　公众对政府的信心反映出，中国人的生活水平普遍得到了改善（67%的人认为得到了改善，(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　12%的人认为恶化了，还有20%的人认为没有变化）。对于生活水平是否会继续改善，人们所持的信念也很相似。根据另一个调查结果，农村地区的乐观度比城市还高（前者为75%，后者为68%）。因此，尽管政府会逐渐完善司法和行政体系，但政治改革的推动还会是相当谨慎的。公众对政府的普遍支持不仅反映了各级政府能正视人们的疾苦，而且表明当地方政府不能快速有效解决民生疾苦时，中央政府会迅速进行干预。此外，这种信心也来自20多年以来绝大多数家庭的收入都经历了快速的增长（Fewsmith，2003）[5].

　　群众普遍受惠于经济增长，加上政府对公众意见的重视，尤其是对民生疾苦的关注，将保证中国的政治稳定持续下去。北京申办2008年奥运会的成功就证明了中国政权的稳定以及领导人的信心。另一个证明来自中国一直不断鼓励自己的学生到美国和欧洲的大学深造。在未来几十年里，中国对国内自由会采取逐步放开的政策。这些发展会使未来的政治制度走向何方还有待观察。但无论如何，政府对公众意见所抱有的负责任的态度表明，中国经济长期持续增长所需要的政治稳定是有可能维持下去的。

　　（李淑萍译 吴素萍校）

　　注释：

　　*本文从CES 会议、芝加哥伊利诺伊大学、芝加哥大学以及西北大学研讨班受益匪浅，此外，A.J.Aiseirithe 、Louis Cain、Thomas Chappelear 、Jack Goldstone、James Heckman、Justin Lin以及Werner Troesken 也为本文提供了很多有益的建议。本文仅代表作者个人的观点，不代表国民经济研究局（NBER）的立场。——作者注

　　**本文作者Robert W.Fogel 为1993年诺贝尔经济学奖得主，《比较》第5辑曾发表了他的《经济学与时俱进》一文。——编者注。

　　1，关于有可能阻碍中国经济增长目标的经济因素的讨论可参见Shane （2005）；
Zakaria（2005）；
R.Wang （2005）；
The Economist （2004a ，2004b ，2005a ）；
Prasad（2004）

　　2，表1中的分解分析所采用的数据来源于《2003年中国统计年鉴》第26页、27页、第313页。由于没有GDP 平减指数，我们采用了零售价格定基指数以获得实际GDP.由于等式（1）中微分逼近值的总和与的值不太一致，因此在计算LFRP、行业间劳动力流动以及部门内生产率的变化对人均收入总体变化的贡献时，我们将等式右边各项的和作为分母。

　　3，其他八国集团国家公布的数据的相对指数与表2所显示的美国的数据有所不同，但没有实质性区别。若采用其他国家的数据并不会根本上推翻分析结论。我在表2中之所以采用的是美国的数据是因为很可能美国的数据也低估了劳动升级对中国经济增长的影响。OECD提供的其他6个八国集团成员国在1997、1998或1999年的数据如下：

　　由于某些原因，上表中美国的指数值与表2中存在差别。该表中的数值算是以男性和女性的平均收入为基础计算的，而表2中的数值则是仅以男性收入的中间数为基础的。此外，上表中的年龄段不包括65岁及以上人士。上表中的年限为1997年、1998年或1999年，不包括2000年。不过两个表最重要的区别在于上表中采用的标准是12年级以下而非9年级以下。需要注意的是，在表2中，具有大学学历的人的收入与只有高中文凭的人的收入之比为173.但在本表中，该比率为181.

　　4，其他有关政治压力和回应的有趣研究包括Huang （1995）；
Chapman （2002）；
Gong（2005）；
D.Wang （2005）；
以及Bremmer （2005）。

　　5，还需要注意的是Fareed Zakaria对自由民主、非自由民主和自由专制所做的区别。

　　自由民主的特征不仅包括竞选，而且还体现在政府会竭力保护公民的自由和尊严而非强权统治，对各级政府的权力进行监督并保证法律面前人人平等。非自由民主也有竞选制度，但选举出的政府会利用手中的权力压制人们的言论和集会自由，并对经济和社会行为进行限制。

　　自由专制实行一党制，但同时给予公民有限的政治权利并改善了一国的经济状况、社会状况和公民权利状况。他提出，目前大多数东亚国家的政府“都是民主主义、自由主义、资本主义、寡头统治和腐败的混合产物——就像1900年左右西方国家的政府”（Zakaria ，1997，第28页；
Zakaria ，2003；
也可参见The Ecolnomist，2005b ）。

　　英文原文：

　　Why China is Likely to Achieve its Growth Objectives

　　Robert W.Fogel

　　Working Paper 12122

　　http://www.nber.org/papers/w12122

　　NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

　　Issued in March 2006

　　1050Massachusetts Avenue ，Cambridge ，MA 02138，

　　I have benefitted from discussions at the CES meeting ，seminars at the Universityof Illinois Chicago ，the University of Chicago ，and Northwestern University ，and from suggestions by AJ Aiseirithe ，Louis Cain，Thomas Chappelear ，Jack Goldstone，James Heckman ，Justin Lin，and Werner Troesken.The views expressed herein arethose of the author （s ）and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NationalBureau of Economic Research.

　　⊙copyright 2006by Robert W.Fogel.All rights reserved.Short sections oftext，not to exceed two paragraphs，may be quoted without explicit permission providedthat full credit，including .notice，is given to the source.

　　Abstract

　　In 2002，the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capitaincome by the year 2020.Starting at income levels of the year 2000，this wouldrequire a growth rate of 7.2percent per annum in per capita income or close to8.0percent in GDP.Such unresolved and emerging problems as growing income disparities，increasing pollution，pressures on infrastructure ，the inefficiency of state ownedenterprises ，and political instability are often cited as reasons to doubt theattainability of the CCP‘s goal.However ，China ’s progress in addressing fundamentalconstraints that might limit rapid economic growth augurs well for the success ofits economic goals.Although there are disagreements about economic policy amongtop leaders ，the continued transformation into a market economy and the promotionof increasing local autonomy in economic matters are not in doubt.In education ，China has substantially increased the percentage of its workforce receiving a collegeeducation ，and continuing growth in this investment in human capital could accountfor a large portion of the desired growth rate.In addition ，the value of improvementsin the quality of economic output unmeasured by GDP ，such as advances in the qualityof health care and education，could raise reported growth rates by as much as 60percent.Finally，the government‘s increasing sensitivity to public opinion andissues of inequality and corruption ，combined with improving living conditions ，have resulted in a level of popular confidence in the government that makes politicalinstability unlikely.

　　Robert W.Fogel ，The University of Chicago ，Graduate School of Business 5807South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago ，IL 60637and NBER ，rwf@cpe.uchicago.edu，

　　Why China Is Likely to Achieve Its Growth Objectives

　　In 2002，the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capitaincome by the year 2020.Starting at income levels of the year 2000，this wouldrequire a growth rate of 7.2percent per annum in per capita income or close to8.0percent in GDP（M.Wang 2005）。Is China likely to meet that objective？Thatquestion has been a subject of debate in Asia ，Europe，and America ，with an arrayof both pessimistic and optimistic views.

　　In this paper I present some reasons for joining the optimists.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　Indeed，I willargue that China‘s GDP is likely to grow at rates of 8percent per annum or morefor a least a generation—that is ，to 2030—and perhaps beyond that date.Beforegetting into substantive issues about the economic，structural，and political problemsthat will have to be overcome if the growth objectives are to be met，it is usefulto look at some numbers in order to set the context for analysis.

　　Exceptionally rapid rates of growth have been achieved by several poor Asiancountries for relatively long stretches of time since World War II.During the twentyyears from 1950to 1970，Japan grew at an average annual rate of 8.4percent inper capita income ，increasing its per capita income more than sixfold，an achievementthat is 50percent higher than the goal set by the Chinese leadership.Over thetwenty years between 1960and 1980，Singapore ‘s growth in per capita income averaged7.3percent.The corresponding figure for South Korea between 1965and 1985was7.6percent ，and Taiwan-China averaged 7.2percent over the same period.Even Chinaexceeded its new growth target over the 22-year period from 1980to 2002，when theachieved growth rate averaged 8.2percent per annum （Fogel 2004b ）。So the targetset by the leadership is well within the experience of the rapidly growing economiesof Southeast Asia.

　　However ，those who question whether the new goal is achievable do so not becausethey are unaware of the past experience of nations within the region，but becausethey doubt that China will be able to replicate the experience of past leaders betweennow and 2020.The doubts arise from beliefs that unresolved or emerging economic，political ，and international problems are likely to reduce the recent growth ratesubstantially.One of the economic issues is the shaky state of the banking system，which is saddled with a high proportion of nonperforming loans.The inefficiencyand unprofitability of many state-owned enterprises （SOEs）is also seen as a threatto future growth.Another problem is the growth in income disparities between therapidly growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior provinces，between urban and rural labor ，and between highly skilled and manual labor （cf.Heckman 2005）。There are also bottlenecks in infrastructure，including pressureon fuel supplies and electrical power ，and the growth of environmental pollution.Although concern over the capacity of China to feed itself has diminished ，concernover the adequacy of water supplies has risen.This is not an exhaustive list ofthe potential economic impediments to a continued high rate of economic growth，but it captures some of the main concerns.1

　　Although I recognize the importance of these issues ，I shall not dwell on themat this point.I view them as issues that need to be addressed during the courseof economic growth and，for reasons that I discuss in the second half of the paper，I believe that they will be addressed.

　　They are certainly on the “to do ”lists of China‘s political leaders andtheir economic advisors ，who stress the need for reducing social and economic imbalances.My initial focus is on more fundamental constraints to sustaining rapid economicgrowth for another generation ，constraints that might undermine long-term growthprospects even if all the right things are done to resolve the current litany ofproblems.

　　To get at these potentially more binding constraints it is useful to disaggregatethe sources of growth in per capita income between 1978and 2002.The process isfacilitated by equations（1）and （2）in Figure 1.Equation （1）is merely anidentity which states that the level of per capita income is equal to output perworker multiplied by the labor force participation rate.In equation（1）the outputof the economy is divided into three sectors：agriculture ，industry，and services.Labor productivity in each sector is weighted by that sector‘s share of the laborforce.

　　Equation（2）is the rate of growth transformation of equation（1）。It saysthat the rate of growth in per capita income is a weighted average of the sum ofthe rate of change in the labor share and of labor productivity of each sector plusthe rate of change in the labor force participation rate.The sectoral weights arethe mid-period shares of income originating in each sector.

　　Table 1shows that 69percent of the growth in per capita income between 1978and 2002was due to increases in labor productivity within each of the three mainsectors of the economy.2The rise in labor productivity was most rapid in industry（6.2percent per annum ）despite the inefficient state-owned enterprises and theinefficiencies in the allocation of capital.As Lin and Tsai（2004，355-356）havepointed out ，the policy of gradually shifting from central control appears to havebeen more effective than the“big bang”approach.By sequencing reforms that successivelyenlarged the scope of the market sector ，even the SOEs shifted most of their purchasesand sales to market prices rather than plan prices.

　　Table 1also shows that while changes in labor productivity were highest inthe industrial sector ，(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　they were nearly as high in agriculture （5.7percent inagriculture as compared to 6.2percent in industry）。Moreover，this high rate ofgrowth in agricultural productivity has been sustained for more than two decades.Table 2shows that although China ‘s rate of growth in agricultural labor productivityover a two-decade period is not unprecedented ，it is at the high end of experiencein both Asia and Europe.Only Korea exceeded the Chinese growth in agriculturallabor productivity between 1980and 1997，but in contrast to China，most of theKorean agricultural labor force had already shifted into industry and services.In the Chinese case ，half of the labor force is still in agriculture ，so the interindustryeffect might yet prove to be substantial.Indeed，it is likely to be somewhat largerin the next two decades than it was between 1980and 2000.

　　Since about 30percent of China ‘s growth rate is likely to continue to comefrom interindustry shifts and modest increases in the labor force participationrate（cf.Johnson 2000），growth rates of labor productivity within sectors needonly average about 5percent per year.

　　Several factors suggest that such growth rates are likely.Despite the remarkableadvances of recent decades，the average technology is still well below best prevailingpractice in each of the three sectors.Hence，growth in each sector will be stimulatedby the diffusion of the best prevailing practice.Moreover，the frontier of technologyis moving out rapidly ，especially in the industrial and service sectors，but alsoin agriculture.Third ，the investment in capital ，especially human capital，iscapable of rapid improvement in the next several decades.Finally ，despite thepreoccupation with possible overstatement of the Chinese growth rate due to inflatedestimates of growth sent from localities，on balance it is likely that the trueChinese growth rate is understated，especially in the service sector，due to thefailure adequately to account for improvements in the quality of output and theunderreporting of small firms.I now want to elaborate briefly on these last twofactors and assess their likely impact on growth rates over the next two or threedecades.

　　The Role of Factor Enhancement

　　Table 3presents enrollment ratios in primary ，secondary ，and tertiary schoolsfor 1980，1990，1997，and 2000.China is compared with seven Asian nations，fourWestern European nations，and the United States.At the primary level ，China ‘s ratios exceed those of all the other nations.At the secondary level China comparesfavorably with the other newly industrializing countries（NICs），but it is behindSouth Korea ，Japan ，Western Europe，and the United States.However，the gap diminishedrapidly between 1990and 1997.In this brief span the enrollment ratio at the secondarylevel increased by over 40percent.China lags furthest behind the rich nationsat the tertiary level.There its enrollment level is between 15and 27percent ofenrollment levels in Korea，Japan ，Western Europe，and the United States.However，once again it is rapidly closing the gap.Between 1990and 2004the Chinese tertiaryenrollment ratio sextupled（China Statistical Yearbook 2005）。

　　It is possible to quantify the impact of enhancing the quality of labor througheducation on the growth rate of per capita income by making use of the equationsshown in Figure 2.Equation （3）is a factor-augmenting production function inwhich .L and .K are indexes of labor and capital augmentation （in this discussionI will focus only on labor augmentation ）。Equation（4）merely rearranges equation（3）to put it in a more convenient form.The dependent variable is now labor productivityand the term in square brackets brings the augmentation indexes together with theindex of total factor productivity.Equation（5）is the rate of growth transformationof equation （4）。It indicates that when all other variables are held constant，labor productivity will grow at the rate of growth of labor augmentation multipliedby labor‘s share in income.

　　Table 4presents the information needed to implement equation （5）。The toppart presents an index of the relative productivity of labor with primary ，highschool，and college degrees.The index is based on the income of U.S.males by educationlevel.It indicates that a college-educated worker is 3.1times as productive ，and a high school graduate is 1.8times as productive ，as a worker with less thana ninth-grade education.3The bottom half of the table indicates the contributionof various scenarios of increases in enrollment ratios.Labor enhancement wouldgrow at the rate of 1.8percent per annum if the secondary ratio reached one hundredin 20years.

　　Multiplying this figure by the labor share indicates that such an achievementwould add about 1.1percent to the growth rate of labor productivity.Labor enhancementwould grow at 7.4percent per annum if the tertiary ratio rose from 6to 25in thenext twenty years ，which would put the tertiary level of education in China atabout where the Western European nations were in 1980.That level of labor augmentationwould add 4.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　4percent to the growth rate of labor productivity，and by itself wouldaccount for over 60percent of the target set in 2002.With a more ambitious expansionof higher education ，reaching enrollment ratios of 50in 20years，labor augmentationwould grow at 11.2percent.The rate of investment in human capital would by itselfadd 6.7percent to the overall growth rate.These targets for higher education arenot out of reach.It should be remembered that as recently as 1980，the WesternEuropean nations had ratios of about 25.Only the United States was above 50.Themovement to enrollment ratios of 50in Western Europe was a product of the lasttwo decades of the twentieth century.In the case of the U.K.，two-thirds of theincrease from 19to 52percent took place between 1990and 1997.

　　The significance of investment in human capital as an engine of economic growthhas not eluded the State Council.In 1998Jiang Zemin called for a massive increasein enrollments in higher education.The response was swift：over the next four yearsenrollment in higher education increased by 165percent （from 3.4million to 9.0million ）and the number of students studying abroad also rose by 152percent（China Statistical Yearbook 2003）。It is currently estimated that by 2010atleast 20percent of high school graduates will be enrolled in institutions of highereducation and the long run target is 50percent by 2050.The tertiary enrollmentratio increased by about 50percent between 2000and 2004（from 12.5to 19.0percent），so the calculations shown in Table 4may well be too conservative （China StatisticalYearbook 2005）。China currently has about 20million students enrolled in highereducation ，which exceeds current U.S.enrollments by about 60percent.（Newcomb2005；
U.S.Statistical Abstract 2005）。It is estimated that in 2005-6China willproduce 3.3million college graduates ，India 3.1million ，and the United States1.3million （Colvin 2005）。However ，in advancing the frontier of scientifictraining，the United States still has a considerable lead.

　　Errors in the Measurement of Output

　　So far I have focused mainly on factor enhancement to support my contentionthat China is likely to achieve its growth targets.I want to turn now to the problemsof measurement on the output side of equation （5）。Errors in the measurementof national income from the output side have become increasingly severe.It is nowclear that official estimates of GDP for the United States badly underestimate U.S.economic growth because they do not take into account improvements in the qualityof output ，especially in such services as education and health care.Children insecondary schools are taught more about science and technology today than postgraduatecollege students used to be taught a generation ago ，let alone two generationsago.

　　Even more dramatic are the improvements in health care.A century and a halfago ，people in their late thirties and early forties were more afflicted by chronicdisabilities than people in their late sixties and early seventies are today.Notonly has the average age at onset of disabilities been delayed by a decade or so，but once disabilities appear，there are now numerous effective interventions.Hernias，which used to be permanent and exceedingly painful conditions afflicting one outof every four males ，can now be repaired by a surgical procedure that in the UnitedStates requires hospitalization for only 23hours.Other areas where medical interventionshave been highly effective include treatment of genito-urinary conditions ，controlof hypertension and reduction in the incidence of stroke，replacement of knee andhip joints，curing of cataracts ，and chemotherapies that reduce the incidence ofosteoporosis and heart disease（Fogel 2004a ）。

　　Yet most of these great advances in health care and education are overlookedin the GDP accounts ，because the values of these sectors are measured by inputsinstead of by output.An hour of a doctor\"s time is considered no more effectivetoday than an hour of a doctor\"s time was half a century ago，before the age ofantibiotics and modern surgery.It has recently been estimated that the value ofimprovements in health care ，if properly measured，are at least twice the costof health care，but such calculations have not yet made their way into the GDP accounts（Cutler and McClellan 2001；
Murphy and Topel 2003；
Nordhaus 2003）。

　　In the case of the United States，my own rough estimates indicate that allowingfor such factors as the increase in leisure time，the improvement in the qualityof health care，and the improvements in the quality of education would come closeto doubling the U.S.annual growth rate of per capita income over the past century（from 2.0to 3.6percent per annum ）。

　　What is the implication of these statistics for understanding the change instandards of living for the typical American？If we use the conventional measureof growth ，the real income of the typical American in 2000was 7times greaterthan it was in 1900.However，if an adjusted measure is used，Americans in 2000had real incomes that were 34times greater than in 1900.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　In other words，80percentof the goods and services that Americans enjoy today are outside of the measuredeconomy （Fogel 2000and 2004a）。

　　What is the implication of the failure to take account of improvements in thequality of output for the measurement of Chinese economic growth？In China the mainincreases in life expectancy took place before the onset of the period of reform.Between 1950and 1980，life expectancy at birth increased from 40.8to 67.8years.By 2000life expectancy stood at about 71.4，an increase of about 0.18years oflife expectancy per calendar year during the period of accelerated economic reform（Keyfitz and Flieger 1990；
China Statistical Yearbook 2003）。Studies of the valueof a statistical life year in rich and poor nations suggest that the value of anadditional year of life in China is about 3.5times per capita income （see ，e.g.，Murphy and Topel 2002；
Viscusi and Aldy 2003）。Hence ，the value of the unmeasuredimprovements in life expectancy may have been high enough to raise the rate of economicgrowth between 1980and 2000by about 60percent.If the true growth of GDP between2000and 2040is 13percent instead of 8percent，then the true size of the Chineseeconomy in 2040will be about 6times the size of the measured economy.Of course，if both the United States and China similarly neglect changes of quality in theirmeasurements，the relative ranking of the two economies may not be changed significantly.

　　Will Political Instability Undermine Economic Growth？

　　So far I have focused purely on economic issues.Some analysts argue that politicalinstability is a serious impediment to China‘s ability to maintain high rates ofeconomic growth.Several scenarios have been outlined in which political factorscould thwart economic goals.

　　Some of these scenarios begin with an economic breakdown brought on by a sharpcyclical downturn that would raise unemployment and undermine a precarious socialstability.Others warn that a growing social unrest has been brought on by the financialproblems and inefficiencies of the state-owned enterprises.These problems havenot only led to rising urban unemployment but have also resulted in the failureto pay promised wages ，pensions，health-care allowances，and housing allowances（Bremmer 2005；
Chaohua 2005）。Still others warn of an impending breakdown in thebanking system，which is beset by a huge burden of nonperforming loans，a breakdownthat could undermine the microeconomic stability of the economy （Garnaut and Song2004）。

　　Other threats to stability that have been observed include：widespread corruption；
internal power struggles；
bubbles in real estate，international trade ，and steel（among other products）；
inequality between the urban and rural areas，betweenthe coastal and interior provinces，between the highly educated elites and poorlyeducated masses ，and between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities.One uniquewarning singles out the sharp rise in the sex ratio concentrated at ages 15–34，which ，it is argued，will translate into high rates of crime and violence and maypromote concubinage.Some single out international tensions ，particularly overTaiwan，which divert the attention of the leadership from their growth objectives（Pei 2005；
Bradsher 2004；
Dunphy 2004，Hu 2000；
Lim 2004；
Business Asia 2002；
McGregor 2004；
Wilson 2004；
EIU ViewsWire 2004）。

　　When speculating about the future ，the range of possible scenarios is virtuallyunlimited.The point at issue is not what might occur ，but what is likely to occur.Moreover，many of the problems singled out are of long standing ，such as the inefficiencyof many state-owned enterprises.While these SOEs may be a drag on the economy，China has nevertheless been able to grow at over 8percent per capita for a quarterof a century.The idea that these inefficient firms will suddenly go bankrupt isfar-fetched.The policy of the State Council has been to gradually phase them outor to reorganize them on a profitable basis so as not to sharply increase unemployment.Not only does the government have the finances needed to continue subsidizing inefficientfirms if it chooses to do so for economic or political reasons，but the burden ofthese subsidies will also gradually diminish，because the share of the industrialoutput supplied by these underperforming SOEs will gradually decline and the burdenof a given level of subsidies will rapidly diminish with the economy growing sorapidly.

　　These points also apply to the problem of the state banks.Although the proportionof nonperforming loans may be about 35percent，China is not in immediate dangerof a collapse of its banking system.It is within the power of the government toremove this burden.The banks originally became saddled with the bad paper becausethe government obliged the banks to finance unprofitable SOEs.The inefficienciesand distortions in the economy produced by banking policies have been relieved bythe large injection of foreign direct investment，encouraged by government policy，which has also facilitated the transfer of advanced technologies to China.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　Withdirect investment going largely into large-scale industry ，the banks have beenable to supply part of the capital needed by small-scale enterprises（Lin ，Cai ，and Li 2003；
Fan 2005）。Movements in the direction of more effectively using themonetary system to manage business cycles ，and contemplated reforms in capitalmarkets ，should also alleviate economic distortions.For example ，the governmentrecently restructured two of the four largest state-owned banks to bring their capitalposition up to international standards.Most important，perhaps ，is the very lowlevel of government indebtedness（less than a fifth of GDP），which gives the StateCouncil leeway to pursue needed stabilization policies，including a rapid restructuringof the banking system ，instead of the gradual policy of reform it is currentlypursuing（Lin ，Cai ，and Li 2003；
Fan 2005）。

　　Although there are disagreements about economic policy among the top leaders，the proposition that China should continue to transform itself into a market economyis not at issue.

　　Nor is there disagreement over the policy of promoting increasing autonomy ineconomic decisions as a lever of rapid economic growth.As many analysts have pointedout ，the government is unified around a policy that has been called“market preservingfederalism.”This Chinese form of federalism limits the central government ‘scontrol over economic decision making ，promotes creative competition among localgovernments ，constrains rent seeking ，and provides an array of incentives to inducecreative local enterprises.This type of federalism is also apparent in the designof the tax system ，which has been called “fiscal federalism ，”and which is aimedat preventing taxation from stifling economic growth.In the tax reform of 1994，the central government limited its primary administration to VAT and taxes on centrallyowned enterprises.It also set up local tax bureaus under the direction of localgovernments to supervise income taxes.While much remains to be done in the designof the fiscal system，especially with respect to narrowing regional inequalities，these issues are on the leadership’s agenda of needed reforms.The central leadershipis also aware of the danger that local autonomy may move in counterproductive waysthat promote rent seeking ，moral hazard，and other forms of corruption ，and thatit must monitor performance and penalize corruption where possible.The successfulunfolding of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national andlocal goals ，to discipline local authorities whose corrupt practices threaten theprogress of reform，and to provide rewards to those who advance it（Lin ，Cai ，and Li 2003；
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003；
Blanchard and Shleifer 2000；
Montinola，Qian，and Weingast 1996；
Krug，Zhu ，and Hendrischke 2003）。

　　Some analysts argue that unless China permits competing political parties ，powerful pressures will build up between the provinces and the center that willundermine political stability and thwart continued high rates of economic growth.Others argue that the unsolved inequalities have also built up pressures at thegrass roots that threaten to become unmanageable（Goldstone 1995；
Ohman 1995；
Esarey2002）。Other issues stressed by analysts include mounting environmental hazards，lagging development of public health programs ，and endemic corruption（Shambaugh2000；
Chapman 2002）。

　　The difficulty with these arguments is that they assume that the leaders ofthe CCP and the State Council are unaware of these problems.The leaders are quitewell aware that the successes of their growth policies have weakened the centralgovernment‘s control over daily life and access to information.Indeed ，one purposeof the reforms was to promote creativity at the local level by promoting local initiativeand by encouraging the entry of global firms into the Chinese market in order tofacilitate new ideas and technologies.Moreover ，critiques of current policiesthat hamper economic growth are encouraged，although competitive political partiesare prohibited.Debates over governmental policies at all levels are as vigorousand wide-ranging at the meetings of the Chinese Economists Society as they are atthe American Economic Association.

　　The leaders of the CCP have responded to the changing economic and social conditionsby changing the central goal of the CCP and by co-opting the elites who are at theforefront of China‘s economic and social transformation.This process of adaptationis reflected in the new slogan of the CCP ，“Three Represents，”introduced byJiang Zemin in the spring of 2000to replace the previous slogan of “Three RevolutionaryClasses ”（peasants，workers ，and soldiers）。

　　The new slogan portrays the CCP as：（1）the embodiment of society ‘s mostadvanced productive forces；
（2）the promoter of an advanced culture ；
and （3）

　　representing the needs and interests of the great majority of the Chinese population.To extend its connections with the elites who are bringing about the transformationof China，the CCP encouraged the formation of a wide array of new business and professionalsocieties with strong ties to the state.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　It also transformed the membership of theCCP ，bringing into its fold the technocratic leaders of business ，social，andintellectual life.During the two decades following 1982，the proportion of theCentral Committee members holding college degrees increased from a little over halfto nearly 99percent（Dickson 2003a and b ）。

　　The 16th Congress of the CCP，which met in November 2002，made provincial leadersthe most prominent group in the Politburo ，representing 42percent of its membership.By contrast ，the military represented only 8percent of the Politburo，and centralparty institutions accounted for 25percent.The balance of the Politburo membershipcame from Shanghai political circles or from institutions other than provincialleaderships or central government institutions.Given the dominant role of provincialleaders in the shaping of national policy ，it makes little sense to dwell on thepossibility of a conflict between the national and provincial leaders ，especiallywhen many of the central leaders came from provincial posts （Bo 2004）。

　　Some analysts argue that leaders of the CCP and the State Council are out oftouch with public opinion.However，the weight of evidence contradicts that view.Local and provincial governments have been using polling techniques to determinepublic opinion on an array of economic and social issues since the late 1980s.Academiccritics of government policies abound and interactions between these critics andtop government leaders are numerous.The range of problems raised by respondentsto surveys mirrors the complaints of academic critics and foreign analysts，includingwidespread corruption ，increasing inequality ，persistent unemployment ，burdensometaxes ，and unpaid pensions.Nevertheless ，the polls also reveal majority supportfor the central government and overwhelming belief that the courts，the press ，and government institutions will be responsive to their grievances（Pei 2001；
Linet al.2002；
China Newsweek 2005）。4

　　Popular confidence in the government reflects the widespread belief among theChinese that their living conditions have improved（67percent better ，12percentworse ，20percent no change）。The level of confidence about whether living conditionswill continue to improve is similar.According to another poll，optimism about thefuture is slightly higher in rural areas（75percent）than in the cities（68percent）。Hence ，it is not surprising that political reform is quite limited ，although thereis an expectation that the government will gradually improve legal and governmentalinstitutions.This generally favorable view of government not only reflects thepragmatic responses of leaders at all levels of government to grievances，but alsothe frequent intervention of the central government with local officials when theyare too slow to respond to complaints.It also reflects the rapid increases in incomeexperienced by the great majority of households for more than a quarter of a century（Fewsmith 2003）。5

　　This combination of widely shared economic advances and governmental attentionto public opinion ，especially with respect to grievances ，is a formula for continuedpolitical stability.One indication of the stability of the regime and the self-confidenceof its leaders is its successful bid for the 2008Olympic Games.Another is itsencouragement of Chinese students to enroll in American and European universities.The gradual loosening of constraints on expression in China is likely to continueover the next several decades.Whether or not these developments lead to a multipartysystem of the American type remains to be seen.However ，the government‘s responsivenessto popular concerns indicates that political stability is likely to remain at thelevel required for continued long-term economic growth.

　　Notes

　　1.Discussions of economic impediments that may foil the growth targets of Chinaare summarized in Shane 2005；
Zakaria 2005；
Morrison 2005；
R.Wang 2005；
Economist2004a ，2004b ，2005a ；
Prasad 2004.

　　2.The disaggregation shown in Table 1is based on data from the China StatisticalYearbook 2003，pp.26，27，313.In the absence of a GDP deflator ，the retail fixed-baseprice index was used to obtain real GDP.Because the differential approximationshown in equation （1）does not quite add up to Y，the sum of the terms on theright-hand side of the equation was used as the denominator when computing the contributionof changes in the LFPR，in inter-industry shifts in the labor force ，and in within-sectorproductivity to the overall change in per capita income.

　　3.The relative index for other G-8countries reporting data were somewhat differentfrom those shown for the United States in Table 2，but not materially so.Theiruse would not materially change the analysis.I prefer the U.S.figures as reportedin Table 2because it is likely that even they underestimate the impact of labor-augmentationon Chinese economic growth.The data reported by OECD for 6of the G-8countriesfor 1997，1998，or 1999are as follows：

　　Canada France Germany Italy UK U.S.

　　Less than 12th grade 100100100100100100

　　(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　High-school graduate 120119128172154149

　　B.A.or higher degree 183201201—263269

　　Source：Sherman ，Honegger，and McGivern 2003，Table A31.

　　The values of the U.S.index in this table differ from those in Table 2forseveral reasons.

　　The values here are based on average income over both sexes rather than themedian income for men only.The age range here excludes persons aged 65and over.The years used here are 1997，1998，or 1999rather than 2000.But the most importantfactor is that the base here is less than twelfth grade rather than less than ninthgrade.It should be noted that in Table 2，the ratio of the income of persons withcollege degrees to those with high school degrees is 173.In this note it is 181.

　　4.Other interesting discussions of political stresses and responses includeHuang 1995；
Chapman 2002；
Gong 2005；
D.Wang 2005；
and Bremmer 2005.

　　5.It is also worth noting the distinction made by Fareed Zakaria between liberaldemocracies ，illiberal democracies ，and liberalizing autocracies.Liberal democraciesare not only marked by contested elections，but also by governments that seek toprotect the autonomy and dignity of individuals against coercion，create checkson the power of various branches of government，and establish equality under law.Illiberal democracies have contested elections but the elected governments use theirpower to repress speech and assembly and to restrict economic and social behavior.Liberalizing autocracies have one-party systems but have permitted individuals limitedpolitical rights and have improved the spheres of economic，social，and civil rights.He argues that most East Asian governments today“are a mix of democracy，liberalism，capitalism，oligarchy ，and corruption—much like Western governments circa 1900”（Zakaria 1997，28；
cf.Zakaria 2003.See also Economist 2005b）。

　　References

　　Asian Development Bank.2004.Key indicators 2004：Poverty in Asia ：Measurement，estimates ，and prospects.Manila ，Philippines ：Asian Development Bank.

　　Bahl，Roy ，and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez.2003.Fiscal federalism and economicreform in China.Georgia State University International Studies Program ，WorkingPaper No.03-13.

　　Blanchard ，Olivier ，and Andrei Shleifer.2000.Federalism with and withoutpolitical centralization.China versus Russia.Typescript ，MIT.

　　http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php？id=818.

　　Bo，Zhiyue.2004.The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party：Formal institutions and factional groups.Journal of Contemporary China 13：223–56.

　　Bradsher，Keith.2004.Is China the next bubble ？New York Times，18January2004.

　　http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink ？index=218&did=525776671

　　Bremmer ，Ian.2005.Can China handle threats to growth and stability ？FinancialTimes.20March 2005.

　　Business Asia.2002.Fog on the horizon.25March 2002.

　　Chaohua ，Wang.2005.Nothing to lose but their power.New Statesman.1January2005.

　　Chapman ，Roger E.2002.Review of Is China unstable？Assessing the factors ，ed.David Shambaugh.H-US-Japan ，October 2002.

　　http://www.h-net.msu.edu/.

　　China Newsweek.2005.Opinion polls to link government and public.Translatedby Li Shen and Yuan Fang for China.org.cn ，27January 2005.

　　http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Jan/119018.htm.

　　China Statistical Yearbook 2005.Beijing：China Statistics Press.

　　China Statistical Yearbook 2003.Beijing：China Statistics Press.

　　Colvin，Geoffrey 2005.Can Americans compete？Fortune 25July 2005.www.fortune.com/fortune/articles/0，15114，1081269，00.html

　　Cutler，David M.，and Mark McClellan.2001.Is technological change in medicineworth it？

　　Health Affairs 20，no.5：11–29.

　　Dickson ，Bruce J.2003a.Threats to Party supremacy.Journal of Democracy 14：27–35.

　　Dickson ，Bruce J.2003b.Whom does the Party represent ？From“three revolutionaryclasses ”to“three represents.”American Asian Review 21：1–24.

　　Dunphy，Stephen H.2004.The China bubble.Seattle Times，1February 2004，Sunday fourth edition.

　　Economist.2004a.A great wall of waste.21August 2004.

　　Economist.2004b.Where are the patients？21August 2004.

　　Economist.2005a.China and water ：Drying up.21May 2005.

　　Economist.2005b.Winning is only half the battle.23March 2005.

　　EIU ViewsWire.2004.China politics ：Rising U.S.tensions.2April 2004.

　　Esarey，Ashley W.2002.Reconsidering Weingast market-preserving federalismin contemporary China.

　　http://www.columbia.edu/~as48/Comparative%20Federalism_files/MPF%2002-0204.pdf.

　　Fan ，Gang.2005.China ‘s tough choices.Global Agenda 2005，140–41.

　　Fewsmith，Joseph.2003.China ‘s domestic agenda ：Social pressures and publicopinion.China Leadership Monitor ，no.6：48–64.

　　Fogel ，Robert William.2000.The fourth great awakening and the future of egalitarianism.Chicago ：University of Chicago Press.

　　Fogel ，Robert William.2004a.The escape from hunger and premature death ，1700–2100：Europe，America ，and the Third World.New York ：Cambridge UniversityPress.

　　Fogel ，Robert William.2004b.High performing Asian economies.NBER WorkingPaper No.10752.

　　Garnaut ，Ross and Ligang Song，eds.2004.China‘s third economic transformation：the rise of the private economy.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　London ：RoutledgeCurzon.

　　Goldstone ，Jack A.1995.The coming Chinese collapse.Foreign Policy ，no.99：35–52.

　　Gong，Xiaobing.2005.Reforms in China：Enhancing the political role of Chineselawyers （includes remarks by Veron Hung）。Translated by Victorien Wu and VeronHung.Presented at a seminar sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace and the Asia Foundation ，2June 2005.

　　http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm？fa=eventDetail&id=781&&prog=zch.

　　Heckman ，James J.2005.China‘s human capital investment.China Economic Review16：50-70.

　　Hu，Fred.2000.Drifting apart.World Link 13，no.5：24–26.

　　Huang ，Yasheng.1995.Why China will not collapse.Foreign Policy，no.99：54–68.

　　Johnson ，D.Gale.2000.Agricultural adjustment in China ：Problems and prospects.Population and Development Review 26：319–34.

　　Jorgenson ，Dale W.，and Kevin J.Stiroh.2000.U.S.economic growth at theindustry level.American Economic Review 90：161–67.

　　Keyfitz ，Nathan and Wilhelm Flieger.1990.World population growth and aging.Chicago ：University of Chicago Press.

　　Krug，Barbara ，Ze Zhu，and Hans Hendrischke.2003.China ‘s emerging tax regime：Devolution，fiscal federalism ，or tax farming？Erasmus Research Institute ofManagement Report Series Reference No.ERS-2004-113-ORG.

　　http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/`papers.cfm？abstract_id=650830.

　　Lim ，Paul J.2004.White-hot China.U.S.News &World Report.15March 2004.

　　Lin ，Gang，Martin King Whyte ，Jie Chen，Edward Friedman ，and Yongming Zhou.2002.China ‘s “credibility gap ”：Public opinion and instability in China.AsiaProgram Special Report no.104.Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars：Washington，D.C.

　　Lin ，Justin Yifu ，Fang Cai，and Zhou Li.2003.The China miracle：Developmentstrategy and economic reform.Sha Tin N.T.，Hong Kong ：Chinese University Pressfor the Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research and the International Center forEconomic Growth.

　　Lin ，Justin Yifu ，and Yingyi Tsai.2004.Reform and development in China：A new institutional economics perspective.Seoul Journal of Economics 17，no.3（special issue ）：335–81.

　　McGregor，Richard.2004.China politics ：Clashes in China raise doubt overstate control.EIU ViewsWire.3November 2004.

　　http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb ？index=46&did=759809111

　　Montinola ，Gabriella ，Yingyi Qian ，and Barry R.Weingast.1996.Federalism，Chinese style：The political basis for economic success.World Politics 48：50–81.

　　Morrison，Wayne M.2005.China‘s economic conditions.CRS Issue Brief for Congress，updated 25April 2005.

　　http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/45465.pdf.

　　Murphy，Kevin M.，and Robert H.Topel.2003.The economic value of medical research.In Measuring the gains from medical research：An economic approach，ed.Kevin M.Murphy and Robert H.Topel.Chicago ：University of Chicago Press.

　　Newcomb ，Amelia.2005.China goes to college —in a big way.Christian ScienceMonitor ，29July 2005，Vol 29Issue 172，1-4.

　　http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0729/p01s01-woap.html.

　　U.S.Department of Education，National Center for Education Statistics.2002.Digest of education statistics，2001，NCES 2002-130.Washington ，D.C.：U.S.Departmentof Education.

　　http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp ？pubid=2002130.

　　Nordhaus，William D.2003.The health of nations：The contribution of improvedhealth to living standards.In Measuring the gains from medical research：An economicapproach，ed.Kevin

　　M.Murphy and Robert H.Topel.Chicago：University of Chicago Press.Ohman，Jack.1995.Post-Deng China ：The possible outcomes.Foreign Policy ，no.99：53.

　　Pei ，Minxin.2001.Cracked China.Review of 2001Shehui lanpishu ：Zhongguoshehui xingshi fengxi yu yuce （Social blue book 2001：Analysis and forecastingof social conditions in China ），ed.Ru Xin，Lu Xueyi，and Shan Tianlun.ForeignPolicy，no.126：78–80.

　　Pei ，Minxin.2005.Dangerous denials ：China ‘s economy is blinding the worldto its political risks.Foreign Policy no.146：56–58.

　　Prasad，Eswar ，ed.2004.China ‘s growth and integration into the world economy：Prospects and challenges.International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 232.Washington，D.C.：International Monetary Fund.

　　http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/232/op232.pdf.

　　Shambaugh ，David.2000.The modern Chinese state.New York ：Cambridge UniversityPress.

　　Shane ，Matthew.2005.China‘s economic growth faces challenges.Amber Waves3，no.1：3.

　　http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/February05/Findings/ChinaEconomicGrowth.htm.

　　Sherman ，Joel D.，Steven D.Honegger，and Jennifer L.McGivern.2003.Comparativeindictors of education in the United States and other G-8countries ：2002，NCES2003-026.

　　Washington，D.C.：U.S.Department of Education，National Center for Health Statistics.

　　http://scsvt.org/resource/global_ed_compare_2002.pdf.

　　Statistical Abstract of theUnited States ：2005.2005.Washington，D.C.：U.S.Census Bureau.

　　Viscusi ，W.Kip and Joseph E.Aldy.2003.The value of a statistical life：a critical review of market estimates throughout the world.NBER Working Paper w9487.

　　Wang，Dan.2005.The old man of Tiananmen.Wall Street Journal，18January 2005.

　　Wang，Mengkui.2005.Growth model needs modification.(点击此处阅读下一页)

　　China Daily ，11May 2005.

　　http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/11/content_441002.htm.

　　Wang，Robert.2005.China ‘s economic growth ：Source of disorder？ForeignService Journal 82，no.5：18–23.

　　Wilson，James Q.2004.Sex matters.Review of Bare branches ，by Valerie M.Hudson and Andrea M.den Boer.Wall Street Journal，13July 2004.

　　World Development Bank.2001.World development report 2000/2001：Attackingpoverty.New York ：Oxford University Press.

　　Young ，Alwyn.2000.Gold into base metals：Productivity growth in the People‘s Republic of China during the Reform Period.NBER Working Paper No.7856.

　　Zakaria ，Fareed.1997.The rise of illiberal democracy.Foreign Affairs 76，no.6：22–43.

　　Zakaria ，Fareed.2003.The future of democracy ：Illiberal democracy at homeand abroad.New York：W.W.Norton.

　　Zakaria ，Fareed.2005.Does the future belong to China ？Newsweek，9May 2005.

　　罗伯特·福格尔（Robert Fogel）简介

　　1926年福格尔出生在纽约市。福格尔1944年进入康奈尔大学，1948年获得学士学位。在哥伦比亚大学继续深造并于1960年在那里得到硕士学位。1963年在约翰·霍普金斯大学获得博士学位。在康奈尔期间，福格尔的兴趣从物理和化学转向经济学和历史。在四十年代后半期对经济前途普遍悲观，也促使他的注意力转移。

　　福格尔1958年在约翰·霍普金斯大学开始执教，但于1959年又转到罗切斯特大学。1964年他进入芝加哥大学，1965年在那里任经济史教授。1965年，他同时兼任罗切斯特大学的教授职位，1975年他把两个职位都辞去，而到哈佛大学任教授。但是，对他来说，既要任人口经济学中心的理事，又要兼瓦格林基金会的理事，所以，1981年，他还是回到了芝加哥大学。

　　福格尔1977年曾任经济史学会会长，1980年任社会科学史学会会长，1978年以后又一直任国立经济研究局的项目理事。

　　福格尔教授的研究领域是：北美死亡率的经济解释，营养、劳动福利、劳动生产力的长期变化，对美国经济增长进行长期观察，对两代人不同的家庭行为数据的分析。通过运用经济学理论及数量的方法来解释经济发展和制度变迁，从而刷新了经济史的研究，因此罗伯特·福格尔以他在计量经济史方面出色的工作荣获了1993年诺贝尔经济学奖。

　　福格尔的《铁路和美国经济增长：计量经济史学论文集》的出版，标志着“历史计量学”或“新定量经济史学：的诞生。这是把新古典经济学的原理同统计推断原理相结合的一门新学科，用以考察这样的反事实性问题：如果铁路从来就不存在，美国的经济增长率会是多少？

　　对那些反对这一问题的人说来答案是：所有历史研究实际上都是提出反事实性问题，不过是采用含蓄的而不是直率的方式罢了。

　　在围绕“新经济”史学的兴起而展开的热烈讨论中，福格尔坚定地维护《美国经济史新释》和《“科学”史学与传统史学》中明确制定的方法。不仅如此，对于19世纪美国铁路的经济影响，福格尔推翻了不少过去的研究；
与恩哲尔曼齐心协力，重新考察了美国奴隶制经济学。美国史是以其受到热烈的争论而著名的课题，而《苦难的时代：美国黑奴制经济学》要算是迄今在美国史方面出版的一本争议最大的书。康拉德（A ·H ·Conrad）和迈耶尔（J ·R ·Meyer ）发表在《政治经济学杂志》1958年4月、10月号上的那篇文章《南北战争前的南方奴隶制经济学》，最先与那种认为奴隶制是一种无效益、不赢利的生产方式的正统观点唱反调。福格尔和恩哲尔曼接受了这篇经典文章的观点，进而严加抨击像种族主义者那样的死死维护正统观点的那些人；
坚持认为奴隶制具有相当的效益，并且唯有像南北战争那样的超经济力量才可能导致它解体。他们的书已多次被译成别种文字。在不到10年的时间里，对这本书的各种评论文献就远远超过了原书本身。

　　有人认为福格尔对经济史的贡献仅仅是用挑衅性方式解释过去，这种看法也许是误解。从历史的档案中重新发掘各种有关资料，是福格尔大部分工作的中心内容。他把美国经济追溯到18世纪，重新建立了诸如这样一些变量的时间序列：生育率与死亡率、女性参与率、移民率、人口流动率以及储蓄率。

相关热词搜索：罗伯特 有可能 中国 目标 增长